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We identified and explained the contractual choices of Mexican coffee traders in selling their 
product and analyzed the traders´ performance. The data were obtained from personal 
interviews with 53 intermediaries in four coffee producing regions of the states of Oaxaca and 
Veracruz, Mexico. Marketing margins were used as an indicator of traders’ performance. The 
results indicate that being a roaster, having a wet processing plant and selling cherry coffee 
negatively affects the use of contracts whereas being vertically integrated has a positive effect. 
The results also suggest that being registered in the National Coffee System (which only a 
minority of the interviewed traders were) increases the margin for the trader. Selling cherry 
coffee, participating in a competitive environment and having a contract decreases these 
margins (at 5% significance) and may thus enhance the performance of the supply chain and 
benefit the producers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Middlemen play an important role in a commodity chain. 
They perform many of the activities required to bring 
goods from producer to consumer, and their productivity 
has a strong impact on the performance of the chain as a 
whole and the welfare of the agents involved (Sexton and 
Lavoie, 2001). Differences in the behavior of middlemen 
can be explained by economic and cultural factors. The 
way intermediaries interact can give information about 
the environment in which they make their transactions 
and vice versa (Fafchamps, 2004; Fafchamps and Minten, 
1999). 
Relationships and the environments in which 
intermediaries act are not static; they evolve over time. 
Agricultural commodity markets have undergone 
significant changes over the past twenty years, changes 
that at the same time  
affect the behavior of agents within a commodity chain. 
This is the case for the coffee chain, too. The major 
change occurred at the end of the nineteen eighties and 
early nineties, when the coordinated marketing system 
under the International Coffee Agreement was 
abandoned. In many countries, including Mexico, this led 
to a withdrawal of the government from the sector, 
creating scope for private parties and their organizations. 
Since then, the degree of state interference has 
fluctuated; private sector organizations or public-private 
initiatives have come and gone.  
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In this paper, we look at a particular aspect of the 
institutional arrangements, namely the use of sales 
contracts by the agents who buy coffee from the farmers 
or from other buyers. 
There is a variety of channels in the Mexican coffee 
supply chain; within these there is a variety of steps 
through which coffee transits from producer to consumer 
(see Annexes 1 and 2). The simplest one is the product 
sold directly from the producer to the consumer. In this 
case, the product is sold at the regional, local or national 
market. Yet, the most common channel is the one 
starting from the producers who sell to the local collectors; 
then there are the regional collectors, and after that there 
are the state buyers; after this, the coffee is transported 
to the border to be sent to other countries by exporters. 
From then on, the product is taken over by processors 
(roasters) of consumer countries. This description implies 
that there are five steps in the supply chain, in this study 
we interviewed intermediaries placed on the first four 
steps. 
Studies show that the relationships with middlemen can 
be crucial for the performance of the commodity chain 
(Gabre-Madhin, 1999;Fafchampset al., 2005).Knowledge 
of the Mexican coffee intermediaries‟ behavior, 
contributes to a better understanding of the coffee market, 
and gives information to improve Mexican coffee policies. 
Therefore, in this paper we investigate the coffee traders´ 
behavior and the performance of the Mexican coffee 
agents. We focus on two coffee-producing states, 
Oaxaca and Veracruz. 
More in particular, the objectives of this work are: to 
identify and explain the contractual sales arrangements 
of traders in the Mexican coffee chain and to assess the 
performance of coffee traders in the states of Oaxaca 
and Veracruz, Mexico. In order to reach these objectives, 
the following research questions need to be answered: 
what are the socio-economic characteristics of coffee 
traders in the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico? 
What are the main factors that affect whether traders 
have a contract with their buyers? And how do contracts 
influence the performance of coffee traders in Oaxaca 
and Veracruz, Mexico? 
The data used in our analysis were obtained by 
conducting face-to-face interviews with 53 intermediaries 
in four coffee-producing regions of the states of Oaxaca 
and Veracruz. Additionally, we held meetings with local 
authorities and people involved in the Mexican National 
Coffee System. Figure 1 shows that coffee prices have 
fluctuated enormously over the past decades, and that 
the margins between fob (free on board) prices and 
producer prices were also quite variable. 
The margins range from 2.30% of the selling price when 
buying and selling cherry coffee to 63.48% when buying 
cherry and selling roasted coffee. We use this margin as 
a measure of the performance of the intermediary. 
Contractual arrangements with their buyers may help 
intermediaries invest in specialized equipment or 
otherwise reduce costs of trading and/or processing. But 
many transactions are not based on contracts. The 
transaction costs of arranging a contract may exceed the 
benefits of having one in cases where reality is difficult to 
capture in regulations, or where contact is already 
intensive. We elaborate on these reasons in the next 
section. 
The empirical work indicates that being a roaster, having 
wet processing facilities and selling cherry coffee 
negatively affect traders‟ use of contracts, whereas 
having dry processing facilities has a positive effect on 
their use of contracts. The findings also suggest that 
selling cherry coffee, participating in a competitive 
environment and having contracts positively influence 
intermediaries‟ performance, while being registered in the 
National Coffee System have a positive effect on the 
gross margin. The remainder of this paper is organized 
as follows: in Section 2, we present the theoretical 
approach; in Section 3, we present the data and methods 
used to analyze the information; in Section 4, we give the 
model specification and likely determinants of contract 
choices; in Section 5, we specify the model of traders´ 
performance and show the empirical findings; and in 
Section 6, we present the conclusion. 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
Why are institutions so important for understanding 
contractual choices and the performance of traders in 
chains? According to North (1989), every process in 
which an exchange is performed has some costs 
involved. In the case of the Mexican coffee sector, one 
can think of the search for market information, finding 
farmers who sell coffee, inspecting the quality and 
transporting the product and arranging contracts between 
the agents who perform the mentioned activities 
(Jabbaret al., 2008). Contracts arise as facilitators of 
these interactions; they provide the possibility of doing 
business at low costs and thus influence the efficiency 
along the commodity chain. If transaction costs are low, 
economic actors will favor spot markets, but if transaction 
costs are high, they will favor contracting or vertical 
integration to lower these costs (Ruben et al., 2007a). 
Additionally, Janvry et al.(1991) have argued that the 
existence of transaction costs might explain why 
households are not entering a certain agricultural market. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) helps to understand 
how agents decide to run their business given the 
environment in which they execute their activities. Some 
traders may choose to buy and sell coffee without adding 
much value to the product they market, as costs and 
uncertainty are high. Others will choose to vertically 
integrate and sell more downstream in order to tackle 
these costs. Some agents turn to contractual agreements 
in order to reduce these costs (Williamson, 1979).Three 
principle attributes of transactions have been identified: 
the frequency with which transactions recur, the 
specificity of the assets necessary to come to a 
transaction, and the degree and type of uncertainty of 
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transactions. Normally local intermediaries make 
contractual arrangements and the roasters and exporters 
go for vertical integration. The TCE theory predicts that 
under high asset specificity and high uncertainty, the 
firms will embrace a highly integrated channel in all cases 
(Shervani et al.,2007); thus more contracts should be 
found for agents with specific assets, uncertainty and 
frequency of transactions. 
In terms of contracts, TCE portraits contracts as methods 
to constrain ex-post behavior, given the fact that there 
may be opportunistic behavior, information asymmetries, 
differences in bargaining power, and possible hold-up 
situations from asset-specific investments among agents 
(Williamson, 1979). TCE focuses as well on the 
determinants and the duration of contracts. It also 
distinguishes between a contractual and a non-
contractual exchange, which has implications in terms of 
the formality of relationships (Masten and Saussier, 
2000). Processing facilities, such as wet and dried plants, 
processing and roasting machines are specific assets for 
coffee, but not always for a specific buyer which implies 
that traders who have these facilities will prefer to have a 
contract with their buyer; in this way, they reduce 
uncertainty and opportunistic behavior. In fact a roasting 
facility provides an opportunity to serve many more 
customers and so leads away from being dependent on 
single buyers. Thus, having a multitude of customers 
compensates for a contract. 
Traders face an uncertainty due to price volatility in the 
coffee market. Considering this possibility, intermediaries 
may want to have a contract with their buyer in which 
they can negotiate schemes to share the risks of a 
volatile market before the harvest season (and therefore 
the buying season) starts. This kind of agreements, in 
which uncertainty is reduced, may give them a higher 
utility. However, not all coffee traders face such 
uncertainty. There are traders who do not rely on coffee 
to make their living because they have another business 
parallel to marketing coffee. If traders can diversify their 
sources of income, they have a reason for not having a 
contract. Moreover, traders who have different lucrative 
activities usually do not have coffee asset-specific 
investments, hence another reason for not having a 
contract. 
Two parts are involved in the transaction costs. One part 
is the ex-ante cost, which includes searching for potential 
exchange agents (consumers or wholesalers who offer 
the best price), the screening of potential agents, and 
bargaining (Keyet al.,2000). The second part consists of 
the ex-post costs that take into account the transfer of 
property rights and the monitoring of compliance of any 
transaction (Rubenet al.,,2007b). When markets are far 
from representing the ideal situation portrayed in 
economic textbooks, variables like trust, reputation and 
informal rules gain in importance (Fafchamps, 2002). As 
Gabre-Madhin (1999) asked, “in the absence of 
formalized market institutions that deter dishonest 
behavior, such as credit bureaus, trade inspection 
services, and commercial tribunals, what institutions arise 
that promote trade among unknown parties?” The answer 
was that the brokers help in doing so. These social 
relationships then have an effect on contractual decisions 
and on trader performance. If there is trust between 
agents, formal agreements may not be needed 
(Fafchamps and Minten, 1999). Furthermore, these 
relationships may serve as substitutes to absent market 
institutions and may help traders to reduce costs and 
perform efficiently. 
The exertion of market power by some firms in the coffee 
sector may also affect the behavior of other 
intermediaries. There is some concern about the level of 
competition within the Mexican supply chain, given that 
agricultural markets can show evidence of low levels of 
concentration of buyers or sellers (Sextonand Lavoie, 
2001). Competition is thus an important element in the 
analysis. Being in a competitive environment is a factor 
that increases the probability of contractual agreements 
between agents as they have to secure the provision of 
the product and the market in which that product will be 
sold (Fischeret al.,2009). Low competition may lead to 
higher marketing margins, which decreases the efficiency 
in the supply chain (Mose, 2007; Schroeter andAzzam, 
1991). 
An environment in which transaction costs are high may 
lead to higher margins, and thus, to a less efficient trader 
and supply chain. Poor physical infrastructure, high costs 
of processing, poor institutions and high costs of 
information gathering and monitoring contracts, are some 
of the costs associated with an inefficient set-up and 
higher margins (Jabbar et al., 2008; Winter-Nelson and 
Temu, 2002). On the other hand, in a competitive 
environment, market power and hence marketing 
margins are reduced, creating a more efficient industry 
(Porter, 1998; Schroeter and Azzam, 1991). In this sense, 
a liberalization process like the one experienced by the 
Mexican coffee sector should end up in a competitive 
structure in which marketing margins of traders are low. 
The Mexican coffee sector went from being ruled by a 
state-led marketing board to a free market set-up. This 
meant that part of the role played by the government in 
the regulated era had to be taken up by private agents. 
This role included not only buying, processing and 
marketing the coffee from growers but also providing 
them with financial and technical assistance. Those 
changes meant that new arrangements between these 
agents also had to be established. They may do so in 
order to reduce the transaction costs and the risk in the 
coffee market. One of these arrangements is that traders, 
especially exporters, may be vertically integrated in order 
to reduce transaction costs (Mehta and Chavas, 
2008;Williamson, 2000; Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2002). 
Until the end of the nineteen eighties, the world market 
for coffee was controlled by a quota system resulting 
from the economic clauses of the International Coffee 
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Figure 1. Prices along the coffee supply chain (own elaboration with data from   
ICO and SIAP). 
 
 
Agreements (ICAs), signed by the main producing and 
consuming countries. These ICAs were first put into 
action in the early nineteen sixties. The agreements 
stated that producing countries had the responsibility to 
control their coffee exports in order to affect world prices 
(Gilbert, 1987). The best way to do this was by means of 
direct government intervention in the producing, 
processing and marketing of coffee. This is why, under 
this controlled regime, most of the producing countries 
had marketing boards controlled by the state. These 
public institutions had the monopoly of the coffee trade 
and some of them were also in charge of technical 
assistance and financial support to coffee growers 
(Akiyama, 2001). 
In the Mexican case, the government created the 
Mexican Coffee Institute (Instituto Mexicanodel Cafe, 
INMECAFE) to control and promote coffee production 
and sales. The Institute sponsored this crop as a 
remunerative alternative for peasants via its different 
support programs(Santoyoet al.,1994). Given that coffee-
producing areas were growing and spreading, the 
Institute had to make sure these regions remained under 
the control of the government. Hence, officials were sent 
and infrastructure was built in several producing regions 
(Pérez et al., 2001). While the INMECAFE and ICAs were 
working fully, there was no need for local or regional 
partner organizations, since every actor in the coffee 
supply chain relied on the effectiveness of the institutional 
environment until 1989. 
Yet, at the end of the nineteen eighties, the ICAs‟ 
economic clauses broke down. This meant that the quota 
system was out, replaced by the free market. At the same 
time, liberalization policies were spreading throughout 
Central and Latin American countries, and Mexico was 
no exception. New coffee policies focused on reducing 
the size of the government and its expenditures, 
prioritizing regulation and macroeconomic stability, and 
abandoning interventions in commodity markets. For the 
Mexican coffee sector this meant INMECAFE had to 
disappear (Snyder, 1999). The Institute was then 
dismantled between 1989 and 1992, creating a void in 
the coffee chain; a void that was to be filled by private 
agencies. In the absence of the state‟s marketing boards 
and direct involvement in the coffee market, new local, 
regional and national traders appeared. 
The local small-scale traders still exist because large-
scale firms lack the information the local and regional 
collectors have about the geographical area where they 
make their purchases. Small-scale traders know where 
the growers live and where the best coffee is sold. This 
means that new contractual arrangements were also 
created between large- and small-scale traders, depicting 
an agency relationship. In the first section of our analysis, 
we will investigate factors that may affect this contractual 
choice, elements relating to asset-specific investments, 
trade-credit relationships, and the type of coffee that is 
marketed by contracting partners. 
A prime reason for wanting to secure a trade relationship 
is having made investments that are specific to these 
relationships. Traders who invest in machinery or in 
assets that can only be used in coffee-related activities 
may want to have contracts with their buyers in order to 
reduce the risk of being locked-in. In this sense, having a 
long-term contract may give them higher benefits, since 
they will not face ex-post opportunistic behavior from their 
buyers, who are aware of the traders‟ sunk costs due to 
asset-specific investments (Williamson, 1979). 
However, traders who face recurrent transactions with 
their buyers, for example those who sell coffee every day, 
and who have not made any specific investments besides 
this, may not need a contractual agreement with their 
buyers. Repeated interactions between agents can lead 
to trust-like relationships that do not rely on formal 
agreements to secure transactions (Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1999). 
Traders may also face asymmetries in information. Some 
large traders are unaware of the location of coffee 
growers or local collectors. With this in mind, small- or 
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Figure 2.Relationship between other economic activities and contract. 
 
 
medium-scale intermediaries who know where to buy 
coffee can signal large-scale buyers that they have this 
knowledge and may want to enter into a contract with 
them. In order to protect this information, intermediaries 
may want to negotiate better prices. If the intermediaries 
who know where to buy coffee, provide this information to 
a buyer without a contract, there is no guarantee that the 
buyer will buy the coffee from them. A contract may also 
reduce search costs involved in transactions and in this 
sense both parties could benefit utility from an agreement. 
Traders face an uncertainty that may be due to price 
volatility in the coffee market. Considering this possibility, 
intermediaries may want to have a contract with their 
buyer in which they can negotiate schemes to share the 
risks of a volatile market before the harvest season starts. 
This kind of agreements, in which uncertainty is reduced, 
may give them a higher utility. However, not all coffee 
traders face such uncertainty. There are traders who do 
not rely on coffee to make their living because they have 
another business parallel to marketing coffee. If traders 
can diversify their sources of income, they have a reason 
for not having a contract. Moreover, traders who have 
different lucrative activities usually do not have coffee 
asset-specific investments, hence another reason for not 
having a contract (see Figure 2). 
Market institutions are a key factor when studying 
performance. The rules of the game can shape the way 
in which traders decide to run their business. In this 
analysis, we will use market institutions as a tool to 
understand traders‟ performance. These institutions can 
determine the way in which traders purchase and sell 
their coffee, how they pay and receive payment, and also 
the way in which they interact with other traders (Gabre-
Madhin, 2001). The assets and the socio-economic 
characteristics of each trader, however, can also 
determine their trading practices. According to Jabbar et 
al. (2008), actors who face the same market institutions 
can have different trading practices, denoting that there 
are trader-specific variables such as asset specificity, 
size and experience affecting trading behavior, and thus, 
their performance. 
We have argued that new agents entered the sector as a 
consequence of liberalization. These changes, as we 
have explained, should furthermore impact traders‟ 
performance. From the fieldwork done for this study we 
observed that, after the liberalization, erstwhile exporters 
decided to become more involved in upstream steps of 
the supply chain; some of them acquired infrastructure 
that was left by the extinct INMECAFE. However, in the 
past twenty years, there has been little new investment in 
processing plants and infrastructure related to the coffee 
sector. This poses a constraint to the coffee chain, since 
processing plants are operating with old machinery. The 
lack of machinery to process coffee and roads in some 
regions also shapes the behavior of traders, since they 
have to take this condition into account in their trading 
practices. 
We use marketing margins as an indicator of traders‟ 
performance as in Jabbar et al.(2008) and Mose (2007) 
since they can give an indication of how traders perform 
given the minimization of their variable costs. These 
margins are measured as the difference between the 
purchase and the selling price of a quintal of parchment 
coffee.
1
 It is important to note that in our fieldwork we got 
information from traders who trade other types of coffee 
besides parchment coffee. In this logic, we had to make 
an adjustment in order to make the quantities and prices 
of coffee traded by each trader comparable. For this 
reason we transformed prices from other types of coffee 
into price of parchment coffee. This was done by applying 
a weight conversion; after this process, we obtained all 
prices in terms of quintals of parchment coffee purchased  
                                               
1 A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment 
coffee, 80 kg of natural dry or 46 kg of green coffee. 
O
A
Other 
economic 
activities 
and low 
level of 
asset 
especifi-
city
Probability of 
having contract
C
Contracting decision and performance of Mexican coffee traders: The role of market institutions 
Rodriguez-Padrón et al  014 
 
 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of coffee per producing state in Mexico. 
 
   State 
 Land 
with 
coffee 
(ha) 
Land 
harvested 
(ha) 
  Production 
(tons of 
cherry 
coffee) 
Yield (tons 
of cherry 
coffee per 
ha) 
   
Farmers 
Average 
land per 
farmer (ha)  
Chiapas 253,462 251,951 529,250 2.10 174,571 1.45 
Oaxaca 185,187 160,888 165,829 1.03 102,513 1.81 
Veracruz 153,435 152,450 332,598 2.18 86,961 1.76 
Puebla 88,577 70,066 259,246 3.70 47,124 1.88 
Guerrero 54,328 53,917 51,152 0.95 21,326 2.55 
Hidalgo 26,335 26,335 40,197 1.53 34,616 0.76 
San Luis Potosi 22,539 22,539 18,688 0.83 17,552 1.28 
Nayarit 19,473 19,473 29,394 1.51 5,401 3.61 
Jalisco 4,497 3,984 4,357 1.09 1,106 4.07 
Colima 3,018 2,633 2,566 0.97 820 3.68 
Tabasco 1,040 1,040 619 0.60 1,211 0.86 
Querétaro 300 300 150 0.50 296 1.01 
Total 812,191 765,576 1,434,046 1.87 493,497 1.65 
Source: Own elaboration with information from SIAP (2008) and (2010). 
Note: Land with coffee, farmers, and average land per farmer referred to 2008, while the other data are from the 2008-09 
harvesting season. 
 
 
and sold by intermediaries. Then, we calculated the 
difference between buying and selling prices and we 
ended up with (standardized) gross marketing margins. 
In the model specification section, we try to translate the 
theory into an empirical model that we can estimate. The 
fact that traders decide to have contracts with their 
buyers is important in understanding the setting in which 
they interact with each other. Knowing which factors can 
affect this decision can help us comprehend how the 
Mexican coffee chain is shaped and how the institutional 
environment (the rules of the game) relates to trader‟s 
decisions to have contracts – the play of the game. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
In Mexico, coffee is produced in twelve states (see Table 
1). These states comprise 52 regions, which represent 
541 municipalities (Escamillaet al., 2005; SIAP, 2008). 
For the purpose of this work, two states (Oaxaca and 
Veracruz) were selected to investigate the relationships 
among coffee traders and the environment in which they 
interact. Oaxaca is located on the Pacific Ocean slope, 
whereas Veracruz is located on the Gulf of Mexico slope. 
The Oaxaca producing regions are characterized by long 
periods of dry and hot weather, which helps the picking 
and processing of coffee beans. As a consequence, most 
of the coffee that is marketed in this state is either 
parchment or green coffee. The Veracruz producing 
areas have humid weather and several periods of rain 
throughout the year. This means that farmers cannot dry 
their coffee as easily as in Oaxaca, which results in them 
selling cherry coffee to the intermediaries (FIRA, 
2003).Cherry coffee is highly perishable and preferably 
must be processed within 24 hours after picking. These 
differences have an impact on the way in which coffee 
traders interact with each other, on their performance, 
and on the type of mechanisms they choose to enforce 
their relationships. 
After choosing the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, the 
next step was to pick the regions (composed of some 
neighboring municipalities) in which the investigation was 
to be carried out. In this study, four regions were selected, 
two in each state. For this purpose we established five 
criteria: the average altitude of the coffee plantations, 
having electricity in the households (a proxy for 
remoteness or isolation), having paved road (a proxy for 
accessibility to urban areas), coffee cooperative 
participation, and the number of intermediaries registered 
in the municipality. 
Regarding the intermediaries in the municipality, their 
number was calculated using the list of coffee traders 
who were registered with the Mexican Association of the 
Coffee Production Chain (AMECAFE, for its initials in 
Spanish) (AMECAFE, 2009). Municipalities with less than 
four registered intermediaries were considered as 
suffering from market restrictions. Therefore, 
municipalities with less than or equal to three 
intermediaries registered were considered as being faced 
with high market restrictions. Those municipalities where 
there were more than three intermediaries were 
considered as having few market restrictions to 
commercialize coffee. 
With the above criteria, we then classified municipalities 
in Oaxaca and Veracruz into two categories, based on 
the number of restrictions they face. Those with four or 
more high market restrictions, including a low level of 
intermediary concentration, were grouped in the first 
category. Those with less than four restrictions but with a 
high level of intermediaries registered were included in 
the second category. A randomized selection was then 
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Figure 3. Location of coffee-producing states and selected regions in Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico. 
 
 
performed to determine one region per category and 
state. The four selected regions, two in each state, are 
shown in Figure 3. 
The selected region in Oaxaca with high market 
restrictions comprises the municipalities of San Felipe 
Usila and San Felipe Jalapa de Diaz. For the region with 
low market restrictions in this state, the municipalities 
included were Pluma Hidalgo, San Pedro Pochutla and 
Candelaria Loxicha. In the state of Veracruz, the 
municipalities included in the high market restrictions 
region were Chocaman and Tomatlan. For the low 
market restrictions region, the municipalities were 
Teocelo and Cosautlan de Carvajal. 
The second step involved was to ask municipal and local 
authorities about coffee intermediaries working there. 
This procedure was undertaken in the field as we visited 
each of the selected municipalities. We then compared 
the names given with the ones in the registered list and 
the ones we found to be non-registered. After having 
gathered the whole list of intermediaries per municipality, 
we proceeded to select a random sample from them. 
Both the registered and the non-registered intermediaries 
selected added up to a total of 34. 
The third step was to include relevant intermediaries that 
were referred to by the people we interviewed in the field. 
These relevant traders were described as being one step 
further in the coffee chain compared to those who 
referred them. Also, some of the relevant traders operate 
at a state or even a national level. In total, we surveyed 
53 intermediaries. Apart from the surveys with 
intermediaries, we also held meetings with local 
authorities and people involved in the National Coffee 
System Committees (NCSC).
2
 For this purpose, we used 
semi-structured questionnaires. 
It is important to clarify that the traders in our sample 
ranged from small collectors to exporters, which means 
that the stage in which each agent operated may vary. 
Some of them buy directly from coffee farmers (or are in 
fact coffee growers themselves) and perform their 
activities at a local level. Others buy coffee from these 
local intermediaries and sell it to traders who operate at a 
state or national level (see Annexes 1 and 2). We also 
interviewed roasters who sell their coffee directly to 
consumers. These characteristics will be taken into 
account when we analyze the contracting decisions these 
agents made. Of course, a contract is an agreement 
between two parties, so the characteristics of one side 
are just half of the story to explain contractual choices. 
However, having these different agents in our sample 
also allows us to depict how the other side of the contract 
might behave, since we cover different stages in the 
supply chain. Unfortunately, because of time and money 
constraints, we did not interview coffee producers who 
were the providers of the first stage of the coffee supply 
chain. 
 
                                               
2 The NCSC are non-governmental organisations constituted to 
serve as mechanisms for permanent planning, 
communication and consultation between different actors in 
the coffee chain. 
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Table 3. Classification of interviewed intermediaries. 
 
      Category 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
Local collectors 18 34.0 
Regional collectors 7 13.2 
Local cooperatives 4 7.5 
Regional 
cooperatives 
3 5.7 
Traders/processors 8 15.1 
Roasters 3 5.7 
Exporters 8 15.1 
Others 2 3.8 
Total 53 100.0 
Source: Own elaboration with data from the survey. 
 
 
Table 2 shows the general characteristics of interviewed 
intermediaries. Traders are on average middle-aged, with 
considerable experience in the business of trading coffee. 
Most of them started their businesses after the market 
liberalization reforms took place in the early nineteen 
nineties. 
Another aspect of traders‟ characteristics was that 43% 
(23) of the respondents were working in other activities 
besides coffee marketing. Among these, eleven 
respondents worked in local grocery stores. The rest of 
them diversified their income by producing and/or selling 
other agricultural products and by trading livestock. Even 
though these intermediaries do not rely solely on coffee 
as an economic activity, sixteen of them agreed that 
marketing coffee is the activity that promises them the 
highest economic benefits. It is important to keep in mind 
that coffee is a seasonal crop; in the case of Mexico, the 
harvest season runs from October to April. Respondents 
devote on average seven months to buy/sell coffee. 
Those who spend more months in the business and who 
engage in the processing or roasting of coffee are large 
exporting companies. 
Using data from the survey, we classified the 
intermediaries by the size of the area where they operate, 
and also by determining whether they add value to the 
coffee they buy and sell by processing. As can be seen in 
Table 3, almost half of the interviewed people operated 
as collectors on a local or regional basis. This means that 
this group of intermediaries did not add any value to the 
coffee they marketed, apart from transport and selection. 
Only 13% of the respondents were affiliated with a local 
or regional cooperative. There were only three cases in 
the sample in which cooperatives directly exported their 
coffee. The rest of the cooperatives only collected coffee 
from its members and then sold it to other intermediaries. 
In terms of value added, we found that 20% of the 
respondents could be classified as processors/roasters. 
Also, if we look at regional differences, given the spatial 
set-up of our field work, we observed that processing 
activities often took place in areas where competition was 
high (see Annexes 1 and 2). 
Regarding intermediaries who are involved in processing 
activities, we found that 20% of all respondents were 
involved in wet processing; all wet processing plants 
were located in the state of Veracruz, as expected. The 
average wet processing capacity was 120 quintals per 
day.
3
 Survey data also show that intermediaries in 
Oaxaca only traded parchment coffee.
4
 This proves that 
our assumptions about differences in the type of coffee 
that is traded in each state are reflected in the 
characteristics of our sample. We observed that 30% of 
the respondents were involved in dry processing activities, 
with an average capacity of 140 quintals per day.
5
 More 
than half of the intermediaries involved in dry processing 
were exporting their coffee, and they accounted for all 
respondents who were classified as exporters. This is 
understandable, as most of the coffee is exported as 
green – and therefore processed – coffee. 
Three of the respondents were roasted. They operated 
mainly at a local level. They supplied to local cafeterias or 
stores, and some even had their own coffee bar. All 
roasters were located in regions with few market 
restrictions, which again showed that all value-adding 
activities were concentrated in areas where it was easier 
to buy and sell this product. 
                                               
3 Coffee processed by the wet method is called wet processed 
or washed coffee. The wet method requires the use of 
specific equipment and substantial quantities of water. 
Following the wet process, the fruit covering the seeds/beans 
is removed before they are dried. 
4 Parchment coffee is obtained after cherry coffee beans go 
through wet processing. To obtain green coffee, parchment 
coffee goes through dry processing. 
5 The dry process is the oldest method of processing coffee. 
The entire cherry after harvest is first cleaned and then 
placed in the sun to dry on tables or on patios. The dry 
process is also known as unwashed or as the natural one. 
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Annex 1. Coffee commercialization scheme in Oaxaca. 
 
 
 
Annex 2. Coffee commercialization scheme in Veracruz. 
 
 
We also asked traders if they had five or more 
competitors in the buying area where they operated. A 
total of 50% of local collectors and 86% of regional 
collectors mentioned that they had five or more 
competitors. Also 50% of both local and regional 
cooperatives stated that they had five or more 
competitors in the area where they operated. For 
processors, roasters and exporters, the percentage of 
traders who answered that they had five or more 
competitors was 75%, 67%, and 100%, respectively. We 
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Table 4. Assets owned by interviewed intermediaries. 
 
Asset 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
Vehicle 30 56.6 
Store 43 81.1 
Coffee-cupping laboratory 6 11.3 
Processing plant 18 34.0 
Source: Own elaboration with data from the survey. 
 
 
can see that in all stages of the supply chain, traders 
perceived their operational context as a quite competitive 
environment in terms of the number of traders they 
observed. However, it is clear that most of our sample 
consisted of traders present in the primary collection level 
of the coffee sector. As one of the interviewed coffee 
producers‟ leaders affirmed, high competition is 
established in areas where coffee farmers sell cherry 
coffee. 
In the survey, 94% of the respondents had coffee 
growers as their suppliers. In addition, some of the 
interviewees made direct purchases from coffee 
producers, even when they worked at the regional or 
national level. Only 28% of the interviewed intermediaries 
had a contract with their suppliers. Half of those who had 
agreements stated that it was a verbal one. 
An agreement between intermediaries and coffee 
growers can be beneficial for both participants. 
Intermediaries provide financial support to coffee 
producers to implement the picking, mainly to cover the 
transport of the coffee pickers and payments during the 
first days or week of the harvesting season. As was 
commented by some interviewers, they give money in 
advance to some coffee farmers in order to engage them 
for the coming harvesting season. Some respondents 
said that using this kind of financial agreement allowed 
them to pay a lower price and still receive a large quantity 
of coffee. The type of agreement set up with the buyers 
depends on the type of coffee that growers normally 
deliver. 
To have as much coffee as possible, large firms instruct 
their commissioners to set up some kind of agreement 
with coffee producers. Normally these commissioners 
have good knowledge about the type of coffee that can 
be bought in the region. They are financed with money 
from the firms in order to fund some coffee producers 
who will later become their providers. It was found that 
some companies also had skilled commissioners to 
provide technical assistance to coffee growers in 
producing and processing coffee. They did so to improve 
the coffee quality. 
 
For many small-scale producers, receiving economic 
support from the buyers establishes the relationship 
between the growers and the intermediaries. This kind of 
financing agreements became more common practice 
under the actual condition than they had been in the 
ICAs´ era; nowadays, no formal bank credit is available 
for small- and medium-scale farmers in the Mexican 
coffee sector. For some coffee farmers, an option to 
tackle this difficulty is to become a member of a 
cooperative that sometimes has access to economic 
support from governmental or non-governmental 
organizations. 
Another aspect we investigated in the survey was the 
ownership of assets by intermediaries, which is shown in 
Table 4. Looking at regional differences, we observed 
that there are more intermediaries with vehicles in the 
zone with high market restrictions in Oaxaca. We argue 
that this happens because this area is isolated, since it is 
located in a mountainous area and has a precarious road 
infrastructure. Thus, intermediaries should own vehicles 
to overcome these difficulties. This can also imply that 
traders located in a region with high market restrictions 
face higher transaction costs due to the mentioned 
isolation that may reflect in their performance and 
contract choices. Only few intermediaries own a coffee-
cupping laboratory, and they are exporters. Cupping is 
important since it is a way of inspecting and ensuring the 
intrinsic quality of the coffee before it is exported. 
A third of the interviewed intermediaries own a 
processing plant, and most of them are located in the 
state of Veracruz. The fact that coffee growers mainly sell 
cherry coffee in the Veracruz regions creates a need for 
processing infrastructure, given that the coffee quality 
decreases if it is not processed within 24 hours after 
picking. Related to this, 80% of the respondents own a 
specific depot or place where they buy and sell coffee. 
The rest buys and stores coffee either in their house or in 
the processing plants. Despite this, traders stated that 
they do not store coffee seeking for better prices. They 
only use these depots to collect the required amount of 
coffee for transport later on. Local and regional 
intermediaries in Oaxaca usually take one week to gather 
the amount of parchment coffee necessary for a load. In 
Veracruz, those who buy and sell cherry coffee take one 
day to collect the coffee and they all sell it within the next 
24 hours. Exporters are the ones who take more than a 
week to gather the amount of coffee needed, given the 
volume they trade. 
When asked about the problems they face as coffee 
traders, 60% of the respondents mentioned that price 
volatility was the main obstacle to commercialize coffee. 
Others mentioned a lack of security when transporting 
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both coffee and money, and quality deficiency as 
problems. In terms of risk coping strategies adopted by 
intermediaries, we found that 30% of the sample tried to 
obtain good information about market conditions and 
prices. The most common way to gather information 
about prices was by phone, accounting for 95% of the 
respondents; internet was used by 37% of the sample. 
Most local and regional intermediaries made daily phone 
calls to their buyers to know the price for the coffee they 
were going to sell. 
The most common type of the agreement between 
intermediaries was an oral contract. Only 15 respondents 
mentioned they used written contracts with their buyers to 
reduce any risk and uncertainty, and they were mainly 
exporters who needed a contract to export their coffee. In 
these cases, the contract was compulsory to deal with 
customs authorities. This group of respondents was also 
the only ones to state that they used the futures market 
as a price risk management activity. Even though the 
government is trying to attract small intermediaries and 
growers into price hedging programs, requirements are 
not easy to comply with. 
Most local and regional intermediaries said they interact 
with only one downstream trader each year. This shows 
that repeated transactions take place between traders 
along the coffee chain. These repeated interactions may 
also be important when analyzing the (non-)existence of 
contracts. The fact that traders have known each other 
for years and that they trust each other may explain the 
absence of written contracts. Verbal agreements arise in 
these relationships, as we observed in the survey. 
However, if there are no written contracts, how can 
buyers be sure that sellers are going to give them their 
coffee year after year (or even day after day)? Forty per 
cent of the sample mentioned that they receive credit 
from their buyers at zero interest, and all of them stated 
they use this money to buy coffee. 
These repeated transactions between traders are a sign 
of an environment in which intermediaries are not free to 
choose who to sell to, especially in the areas faced with 
high market restrictions. To assess this, we asked 
intermediaries whether they were now selling to a 
different person than they were five years ago. We 
observed that in the Oaxaca region with market 
restrictions, 60% of the intermediaries had changed 
buyer, because they were either looking for better prices 
or the last buyer did not respect their previous 
agreements. This result can be seen as an indication of 
intermediaries being free to choose the buyer that best 
fits their needs. 
Not all interviewed traders followed regulations 
established in the coffee sector. Twenty five per cent of 
the sample was registered in the National Coffee System 
(NCS). After registration, agents have to fulfill some 
requirements and pay an annual fee to be part of this 
system. The requirements are that one has to be legally 
established as a firm or, in the case of a natural person, 
one needs to have proper identification, a fiscal address, 
one has to be up to date with tax payments, and one 
needs to have a written recommendation from an active 
member of the coffee sector, among other things. Sixty 
per cent of the respondents were not registered in the 
NCS as intermediaries. 
Most of the intermediaries who were not registered in the 
system belonged to the categories of local and regional 
collectors. When asked about the reasons for not being 
registered they mentioned that there were many 
requirements and a lot of paper work in order to be in the 
system. Since registered traders issue a bill to coffee 
growers in which the quantity and price of the transaction 
is stated, and this bill is then used by growers to get 
government subsidies, most unregistered intermediaries 
get these bills from buyers working downstream in the 
coffee chain to satisfy the producers‟ demand for the bills. 
The coffee chain starts with cherry coffee sold by growers; 
it is then transformed into parchment coffee, which is 
processed into green coffee, the type that is commonly 
exported. After that the green coffee can be transformed 
into roasted and ground coffee. In terms of the 
conversion from cherry to parchment coffee, we know 
that 245 kilograms of the former make one quintal of the 
latter. Also, the average cost for doing wet processing is 
146 Mexican pesos per quintal. In this case, with the 
weight conversion, we multiply the price of one kilogram 
of cherry coffee to get a price per quintal of parchment 
coffee and add the processing cost to make it 
comparable. 
When going from green to parchment coffee, the weight 
conversion applied is that a quintal of green coffee is 
equivalent to 0.80 multiplied by the weight of a quintal of 
parchment, and the costs to be subtracted are 110 
Mexican pesos per quintal, indicating dry processing. We 
subtract the costs, since green coffee is one step further 
in the processing stage and to get prices in terms of 
parchment coffee can be seen as going backwards in this 
stage. To go from the prices of roasted coffee to those of 
parchment coffee, and knowing that the former is sold per 
kilogram, we multiply by 37.5 to get the weight equivalent 
of a quintal (in kilograms). We also have to subtract the 
associated processing costs, which in this case are 267 
Mexican pesos; this is because we subtract both the 
costs of going from parchment to green coffee (110 
Mexican pesos per quintal) plus the costs of going from 
green to roasted coffee (157 Mexican pesos per quintal).
6
 
After this process, we obtained all prices in terms of 
quintals of parchment coffee purchased and sold by 
intermediaries. Then, we calculated the difference 
between buying and selling prices and we ended up with 
standardized gross marketing margins. From the 53 
traders in our sample, 44 observations were affected by 
this conversion. We could not perform the conversion on 
                                               
6 The processing costs per each of the steps in the supply 
chain were obtained from the interviewed processors. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis (N = 53). 
 
   Variable                           Units Mean SD 
Having contract 1 if the intermediary has a contract 0.60 0.49 
Margins
1
 Mexican pesos per quintal 410 687 
Experience
2
 Years of experience in the coffee business 14.09 9.21 
Other business 1 if the intermediary has another business 0.43 0.50 
Owns vehicle 1 if the intermediary owns a vehicle 0.57 0.50 
Restricted region 
1 if the intermediary works in a restricted region for 
marketing coffee 
0.40 0.49 
Roaster 1 if the intermediary is a roaster 0.23 0.42 
Wet processing 
plant 
1 if the intermediary owns a processing plant 0.25 0.43 
Dry mill 1 if the intermediary owns a dry mill 0.30 0.46 
Long-term 
relationship 
1 if the intermediary established a long-term 
relationship 
0.34 0.48 
Sells cherry 
coffee 
1 if the intermediary sells cherry coffee 0.19 0.39 
Competition 
1 if there is competition in the region where the 
intermediary works 
0.68 0.47 
Registered in the 
NCS 
1 if the intermediary is registered in the NCS 0.42 0.50 
Buyer is 
registered 
1 if the buyer is registered in the NCS 0.60 0.49 
Volume of sales
4
 Quintals per season 4,250 7,708 
Veracruz 1 if the intermediary resides in the state of Veracruz 0.49 0.54 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from the survey. 
     Notes: 
1
The minimum is 25 and the maximum is 3,000. 
 2
 The minimum is 2 and the maximum is 46. 
 3
 The other business x owns a vehicle. 
 4
 The minimum is 50 and the maximum is 36,000. 
 
the whole sample, since some traders refused to tell us 
their selling price. Furthermore, a limitation to this 
conversion is that the average costs we took into account 
in this process could change for each trader given their 
infrastructure and technology. However, we also could 
not get more precise costs because most interviewees 
did not share this information with us. 
With the above characterization of coffee traders in the 
states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico, we constructed 
a set of variables to answer the research questions. A 
logit regression was performed to find variables affecting 
the intermediaries‟ decision to have a contract (or not) 
with their buyer. In this procedure, we used several 
explanatory variables related to individual, regional and 
market characteristics to predict the probability of a trader 
having a contract. To assess the performance of traders 
in the Mexican coffee sector, we calculated their gross 
margins. Then we investigated which variables affected 
the intermediaries‟ performance thus measured. To do so, 
we performed an ordinary least squares regression. 
 
CONTRACT CHOICES 
Model Specification 
 
The decision to contract with another agent can be 
expressed a discrete choice model. In this case, an 
intermediary will choose to enter into a contract with his 
buyer if the expected benefits of having one are greater 
than those of arranging the transaction in an alternative 
way (Masten and Saussier, 2000). In other words, a 
trader will choose to enter into a contract if the expected 
utility of having one is greater than the expected utility of 
not having a contract, otherwise the choice will be not to 
have a contract. 
We constructed a set of variables that represent the 
socio-economic characteristics of intermediaries, as well 
as some indicators of their business practices and their 
relationship both with other traders and the environment 
in which they perform their activities (Milagrosa, 2007). 
Table 5 lists the variables that were included in the 
regressions. 
The dependent variable was a dummy that took the value 
of one if a trader had a contract and zero if not. It also 
stood for those agents who were part of a vertically 
integrated organization. 
 
As part of contracting decisions of traders in the Mexican 
coffee sector, factors like, among other things, asset 
specificity, bounded rationality, power relationships and 
opportunistic behavior have an effect on the traders‟ 
contracting decision. At the same time, these factors can 
also have an effect on the performance of the firm. 
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Table 6. Determinants of contract engagement (logit). 
 
           Variables Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Experience  -0.027 (0.582)  
Restricted region 0.591 (0.450)  
Roaster  -3.285 (0.016)** -0.673 
Wet processing plant  -2.099 (0.050)** -0.478 
Dry mill   2.657 (0.037)**  0.449 
Long-term relationship   1.054 (0.246)  
Sells cherry coffee  -2.701 (0.026)** -0.587 
Veracruz  -0.042 (0.967)  
Intercept   1.462 (0.161)  
Observation numbers 53  
Likelihood Ratio (LR) index -25.32 
McFadden's R² 0.288  
 
Note: P-values in parenthesis. * and ** refer to significance at 10% and 
5%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Results of Contract Choices 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the logit estimation of the 
model for the decision made by traders to have a contract 
with their buyer. 
The first variable found to be significant (at a 5% level) in 
our model was the one that indicates whether a trader is 
a roaster. The magnitude of the marginal effect is also 
significant, since being a roaster decreases the 
probability of having a contract by 67%. We expected a 
positive sign (meaning an increase in the probability of 
having a contract) given the fact that roasters are traders 
who are vertically integrated and have made specific 
investments. Most roasters do not trade large amounts of 
coffee and usually sell their coffee to incidental 
customers. This means that they may choose other types 
of arrangements with these clients, especially spot 
market transactions, rather than formal contracts. 
The wet processing plant variable negatively affects the 
decision to have a contract. Apparently, wet processing 
does not make the owner dependent on single buyers, 
and in this sense, the asset is not „specific‟. The opposite 
result was found for having a dry mill which is more used 
further downstream, notably by exporters. This 
magnitude of the associated marginal effect of the 
variable of owning a dry mill increases the likelihood of 
having a contract by 45%. 
The last variable that was found to affect the contracting 
decision is the one depicting a trader who sells cherry 
coffee. The associated marginal effect shows that selling 
cherry coffee decreases the probability of having a 
contract by 59%. This finding is in line with our 
expectations. Traders who sell cherry coffee face 
repeated transactions with their buyer, and then trust-like 
relationships can be chosen over formal contractual 
agreements (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999). 
In our approach of selecting the four regions, we included 
two regions as restricted in terms of having least quantity 
of traders operating, low level of producers´ organization 
and being far from the coffee buying centers. We 
included this variable in the analysis but found that it was 
not significant in explaining the traders´ contracting. 
Hence the overall marketing environment is no important 
factor for contracting. 
 
TRADERS’ PERFORMANCE 
Model Specification 
 
To find out which variables explain the variation of the 
margin, the (standardized) gross margins were included 
in a linear regression model as dependent variable. In 
this sense, we regressed the margins on a set of 
variables depicting trader‟s socio-economic, marketing 
and institutional characteristics. This linearization allows 
us to use the concepts drawn from the theory and apply 
them in an empirical way. In this study, by performance 
we mean the gross margins traders can get for the coffee 
they market, that is, the difference between purchase and 
selling prices. 
Experience in marketing coffee was the first independent 
factor included in the model. As we have mentioned, 
specific experience in marketing coffee is not the same 
as experience in the coffee sector, which can be given by 
a trader‟s age. Most of the traders in our survey have had 
experience in the coffee sector even though they were 
not engaged in trading coffee. We expected a positive 
relation of this factor with the traders´ performance. In 
terms of the characteristics of the firms, we utilized the 
variable of whether a trader had another activity to obtain 
income from. We expected that if traders diversified their 
livelihood they would have lower margins because they 
did not rely solely on the profits from trading coffee 
(Jabbar et al., 2008). 
The theory tells us that assets owned by a trader play a 
role in their performance. This is why we included vehicle 
ownership as an independent variable. The expectations 
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Figure 4. Size of intermediaries vs. marketing margin (own elaboration with data 
from the survey). 
 
 
for this variable were twofold. On the one hand, traders 
who own a vehicle may have more working capital than 
those who do not. In this sense, margins for these traders 
may be low, because they have the ability of having a 
large volume of business (see Figure 4). This means that 
even though they have a small margin per quintal sold, 
they have the capital to buy more coffee and compensate 
(Jabbar et al., 2008). On the other hand, since a vehicle 
forms a costly asset, this would require a higher return 
from their business, thus margins might be high. 
The next set of variables show first the degree of 
integration that a given firm can have and secondly, the 
stage in the coffee chain in which a trader can be found. 
In our sample, some coffee agents had large margins but 
small businesses in terms of the quantity of the coffee 
they market. 
We included a variable that indicates whether 
intermediaries traded cherry coffee. Traders who buy and 
sell cherry coffee should do the buying and selling 
transactions within 24 hours. This can be detrimental to 
their performance, since the urge to sell their coffee can 
deprive them of the opportunity to find better options in 
the market. This may also show that, given the 
environment in which they participate, they decide to sell 
cherry coffee because this means incurring lower costs. 
Hence, we expected a negative sign for this variable in 
the OLS regression. 
Operating in a (non-)competitive environment affects the 
way traders perform. This is why we included a variable 
that indicates whether a trader operated in a region with 
more than five traders. We expected that the more 
competitive the environment was, the smaller the margins 
would get (Mose, 2007). This means that firms will look to 
compensate low margins with larger volumes of coffee 
being marketed. 
Being registered in the NCS is another explanatory 
variable in the OLS model. Traders who had more 
knowledge about how to develop their business 
performed better or had lower margins than those who 
had less knowledge (who were not registered in the NCS). 
Intermediaries might give lower prices to their providers 
in exchange for the bills; thus, traders would seek higher 
margins. 
The next variable included in the model was the decision 
made by traders to have a contract with their buyer. This 
variable tries to link the concepts of contract with the 
traders‟ performance. Changes in the institutional 
framework should lead to contractual arrangements 
between parties in order to minimize costs (North, 1990). 
This means that having a contract should lead to lower 
margins as a consequence of such cost minimization. We 
should keep in mind that the margins we consider for our 
model consist of the difference between buying and 
selling, and that the contract we analyze is between 
traders and their buyers. In this sense, if there is in fact a 
contractual agreement, it could only secure the selling 
price. We used the estimated probability of having a 
contract obtained from the logit model to avoid a potential 
endogeneity problem. 
 
Results of Traders’ Performance 
 
Taking into account the possibility that having a higher 
gross margin would make it more likely to there would be 
more money to start another business or to buy a vehicle; 
and also that having a higher gross margin, traders would 
be more likely to be registered in the NCS, we suspected 
that there was an endogeneity problem. We did a 
Hausman test for those variables to check this and found 
that the problem was not present. 
The results for the second estimation procedure are 
included in Table 7. The first variable listed as significant 
for our analysis of margins is the „sell cherry coffee‟ 
dummy. The model shows that a trader who sells cherry
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Table 7. Factors explaining gross log-transformed margins 
(OLS). 
      Variable Coefficient 
Experience -0.023 (0.124) 
Other business -0.145 (0.595) 
Owns a vehicle  0.086 (0.767) 
Roaster  0.853 (0.122) 
Dry mill  0.271 (0.568) 
Sells cherry coffee -1.936 (0.000)*** 
Competition -0.689 (0.021)** 
Registered in the NCS  1.070 (0.007)*** 
Buyer is registered in the NCS -0.254 (0.434) 
Having a contract (predicted) -1.599 (0.062)* 
Intercept  6.831 (0.000)*** 
Observation numbers  43 
R squared  79.99  
Note: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
coffee will have lower margins than one who sells other 
types of coffee. As we mentioned before, traders dealing 
with cherry coffee have to buy and sell their product 
within the next 24 hours to avoid loss of quality. Traders 
who sell cherry coffee also face lower transaction costs 
and this is reflected in lower margins. The latter may 
indicate that there are not enough incentives and market 
institutions encouraging them to invest in adding 
processing value to their product. 
The results show that an intermediary who operates in a 
more competitive environment experiences a 69% 
decrease in the margins. This finding is consistent with 
the theory in the sense that higher competition lead to a 
lower marketing margin. 
The output of our regression indicates that traders who 
are registered and arguably operate under the rules set 
by the current structure of the coffee sector get larger 
margins than those who are not. This finding may be 
related to the fact that registered buyers are obliged to 
declare taxes and pay the government a certain amount 
for the value of the coffee they buy. The latter is required 
by a government program named The Stabilization of 
Coffee Pricing Fund. 
The fact that traders decide to engage in contractual 
agreements with their buyers reduces the gross margins. 
This shows that, as theory suggested, agents who make 
the decision to have contracts may face lower costs, 
since the reason to enter into such contracts was to 
tackle risks and uncertainty present in the market. In this 
sense, when dealing with lower costs, traders can settle 
for smaller per quintal margins. The rest of the variables 
included in the model made no significant contribution 
toward explaining coffee traders‟ performance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Liberalization of the market should bring about a change 
in the institutional environment of the market. This has to 
result in a more competitive framework, in which agents 
have to find new ways to relate to each other to increase 
their earnings. In this paper, we investigated whether that 
proposition can be proven for the Mexican coffee supply 
chain. Twenty years have passed since the Mexicans 
experienced a transition from a state-controlled system to 
a free market. We provide some evidence on the 
successes and failures of the new institutional framework 
for this sector. 
One of our results indicates that coffee agents have 
involved themselves in different activities as a response 
to the transition from a state-led commodity chain to a 
liberalized environment. We described how some of them 
decided to vertically integrate in order to reduce 
transaction costs and achieve higher efficiency in the 
market, relying on a larger volume of business to have 
enhanced profits. Others, on the other hand, invested in 
assets that allowed them to add value to their product 
and to attain a better performance in terms of margins 
per unit of product sold. 
Most of the traders are unknown to the government, and 
thus are unable to participate in any governmental 
initiative. Data indicate that 60% of the traders are not 
registered in the National Coffee System. That situation 
creates unsettling circumstances for small-scale traders. 
Traders having processing facilities do not have more 
contracts. If agents are vertically integrated, such as 
roasters, they have less contracts, but if the traders have 
processing facilities in an earlier stage of the supply chain 
such as dry mills, they have more often contracts. In the 
first stage of the supply chain, having wet mills reduces 
the probability of having contract. These results are in 
line with the transaction costs economic theories in the 
sense that most contracting occurs where the market is 
thinnest: in the middle stage of the chain. 
An interesting result is that high degree of competition will 
increase the chain‟s efficiency and lower the margins. 
Having a contract helps in reducing the uncertainty and 
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any opportunistic behavior, hence an increase in the 
performance (lower margin) is observed. 
An important finding is that the stage of the Mexican 
coffee sector we analyzed appears to be reasonably 
competitive. A challenge for further research related to 
the issues we tackle in this research is to gather precise 
data to perform a similar analysis at all stages of the 
coffee supply chain. 
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